A new typology of players is proposed, in which actions in a game are classified as instinctive or contemplative. A player's type is determined by the probability that he chooses a contemplative action. In order to test this typology, a set of 11 games was analyzed in which the classification of actions as instinctive or contemplative is relatively natural. The classification is shown to be supported by response time data, where instinctive (contemplative) actions are correlated with fast (slow) responses. A subject's contemplative index (CI) is defined as the proportion of games in which he chose a contemplative action. It is found that for each of the 11 games, the CI in the other ten games is a good predictor of whether he chooses a contemplative action in that game.
Introduction
The goal of the paper is to suggest a new typology of decision makers in strategic situations. A "type" is defined as a category of individuals with common characteristics. In both the theoretical and experimental literature, these common characteristics constitute a mode of behavior often described by a distinct preference relation or a procedure of choice. Thus, for example, an agent is a type 1 in the k-level literature if he always maximizes his expected payoff as a best response to what he perceives as level 0 behavior. The "crazy" type in the repeated chain store paradox game is an individual who enjoys fighting and will do so in all circumstances. The impatient type in bargaining is one who utilizes a low discount factor.
Economic models are generally characterized by a rigid definition of types, reflecting the view that individuals are "programmed" to act according to clear-cut procedures or a well-defined preference relation. This, however, appears to be counterfactural to reality. Consider, for example, the classification of people as "good" or "evil". A good person does not always choose the good action and the evil person does not always choose the evil action. The distinction between good and evil people is based on the classification of actions into good and evil. A good person is one who chooses the course of action labeled as "good" significantly more often than an evil person and vice versa.
The proposed typology is based on the classification of actions in a game as instinctive or contemplative. A person's type is determined by the probability that he will choose a contemplative action. Thus, a player will be classified as type p if the probability of him choosing a contemplative action is p.
The main body of the paper consists of identifying the typology for a specific dataset. The first part of the paper (Section 3) provides the groundwork for defining the typology based on eleven games available on the abovementioned site. The strategies in each of the game are partitioned into instinctive and contemplative categories. The classification of actions as instinctive or contemplative will be based on a combination of intuition and response time. As in Rubinstein (2007 Rubinstein ( , 2013 , it is suggested that response time is a simple, cheap and attractive indicator of whether the strategy used in a game or a decision problem is the result of an instinctive or cognitive process. This approach is in line with Kahneman (2011) who classified quick and instinctive responses as being the result of system I processes and slower contemplative responses as being the result of system II processes.
The second part of the paper (Section 4), examines the effectiveness of the proposed typology by using the data for ten of the games to predict the choice in the eleventh. It will be demonstrated that the contemplative index (CI) of a player (based on any of the ten-game sets) is a useful predictor of the probability that the player will choose a contemplative action in the eleventh game.
The third part of the paper (Section 5) analyzes some additional games in light of the new typology. The distinction between instinctive and contemplative actions in these examples is not as clear but is nonetheless informative for interpreting behavior.
Before arriving at this typology, two alternative systems were considered. In the first, clustering techniques were used to find correlations between the action taken by a player in one game and the action taken by him in another game. Based on the results, one can surmise that it is rare to find tight correlations between the behavior of a subject in two different games, unless the games are very similar. It appears not unreasonable to conclude that a player's strategies in two different games (with the same preference on the consequences) are independent of one another.
The second alternative was more promising and was proposed and applied in Rubinstein (2013) in a non-strategic context. This typology classifies people as (relatively) fast or slow. For each subject and each problem, a local rank was defined as the fraction of subjects who answered the question faster than he did. For each subject in the dataset who answered at least 9 problems (the median number of problems answered by a subject was 15), a "Global Index" (GI) was defined as the median of his local ranks. Thus, a high global rank would indicate a systematically slow subject while a low global rank would indicate hastiness. Section 6 presents results regarding the connection between GI and the choice of contemplative actions.
Comment on the Literature:
The use of response time to open the "black box" of decision making is well-established in psychology and goes back 150 years to the work of Franciscus Cornelis Donders (see Donders (1969) ). Psychologists, however, generally study response time in contexts where it is measured in fractions of a second. In the context of choice problems and game situations, response time measures the time spent reflecting on and thinking about a decision and is measured in dozens of seconds and even minutes.
For reasons beyond my understanding, economists were hostile to the use of response time until recently, when it suddenly became a legitimate and popular tool. Currently, response time is used in the literature for a number of purposes (see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2014) for a recent classification of the RT literature). In this study, response time is used as follows:
To interpret the meaning of choice in games. Previous works that used RT in this way include: Rubinstein (2007) (for a variety of games), Lotito, Migheli, Ortona (2011) (a public goods game), Agranov, Caplin and Tergiman (2012) (guessing games), Arad and Rubinstein (2012) (General Blotto Tournament) , and Brañas-Garza, Meloso and Miller (2012) and Hertwig, Fischbacher and Bruhin (2013) 
(the ultimatum game). (ii)
To serve as a measure for "predicting" the behavior of players in a game (see Clithero and Rangel (2013) , Rubinstein (2013) and Schotter and Trevino (2013) ). (iii) As a basis for defining a typology of players. In the last part of the paper, response time will also be used to define a typology of players as fast or slow. This attempt is an application of Rubinstein (2008 Rubinstein ( , 2013 .
The Data
This type of research requires a large number of subjects. For the current study, this was accomplished using the data accumulated on the didactic website gametheory.tau.ac.il. The pool of subjects is diverse relative to the standard pools of subjects used in experimental game theory. Subjects were students in game theory courses from around the world. As of the beginning of 2014, the site had 50,000 users from 40 countries (some as "marginal" as China and India…). More than half were from the US, Switzerland, UK, Colombia, Argentina and the Slovak Republic. Needless to say, the sample is not representative of the "world" in any serious way.
The site contains a bank of game-theoretic and decision-theoretic problems. Teachers, most of whom teach game theory courses, register on the site, assemble sets of problems and assign them to their students. Students respond to the problems anonymously. Teachers have access to statistics summarizing the choices of their students and a comparison to statistics for all other respondents. The website records both the students' answers and their response times.
The most commonly voiced criticisms of research of this type are the non-laboratory setting, in which there is no control over subjects, and the lack of monetary incentives. Rubinstein (2013) responded to these criticisms and also noted that statistical tests were unnecessary in view of the clear results obtained.
Each problem is a description of a hypothetical game. A subject responds to the problem by specifying his anticipated behavior in the role of one of the players. For each problem, the responses of the quickest 5% of the subjects were removed (since it is clear that they randomly chose an answer). Each problem is given two identifiers: a name and the serial number in the gametheory.tau.ac.il system (marked with #). (The serial numbers make it easier to use the database.)
Response time (RT) is measured as the number of seconds from when a problem is sent to a subject until his response is recorded by the server in Tel Aviv. Given the speed of communication, we can treat this as the time the problem is on the subject's screen. A commonly used indicator of speed of response is Median Response Time (MRT).
Another commonly used graphical tool is the response time cdf. For each problem, the set of alternatives is divided into categories (which are often singletons) and for each category , is the proportion of subjects that chose an alternative in and who responded within seconds. Rubinstein (2007 Rubinstein ( , 2013 found that the graphs of the response time cdfs display remarkable regularities: (1) They have a common shape that resembles an inverse Gaussian or lognormal distribution. (2) The response time cdfs (given a particular problem) are almost always ordered by the "first-order stochastic domination" relation. For any two exclusive categories C and D, if for all t, then we say that the C-choosers respond faster than the D-choosers.
Eleven games
This section contains the basic results for eleven games. Results for some of the games were reported in Rubinstein (2007) though with much smaller samples. In each game, there is a natural classification of the actions as either instinctive or contemplative (notated in red). In some of the cases, the instinctive actions are associated with salience. Starting with Thomas Schelling, researchers have been searching for a unified theory to explain the concept of salience but we still lack such a general theory. As a result, the k-level reasoning literature has no theory to explain the level-0 strategy and either relates to it as a uniform random strategy or justifies it on intuitive grounds, as I do. I don't have a theory of my own to explain the classification, which is currently based on my own intuition. However, the classification is not entirely subjective and will be shown to be supported by evidence: contemplative actions are associated with significantly higher RT than the instinctive ones.
Zero-Sum Games (#15, #145 (16+144))
The following simple zero-sum game was presented to students in the form of a bi-matrix where payoffs were presented as numbers, without specifying their interpretation (students in game theory courses are, of course, familiar with this kind of presentation).
n=4715 Percent MRT T 62% 41s B 38% 57s The subjects (n=4715) "played" the game in the role of the row player. Whether one interprets the payoffs as monetary payoffs or vNM utilities, Nash equilibrium predicts that more players will play B than T. However, the action T was the more popular choice (62%). The action T is the instinctive one due to the high payoff associated with it while B is the contemplative choice since it requires thinking about the other player's move. Indeed, the RT of T (41s) is much lower than that of B (57s).
Comment:
Two other versions of the game appear on the site: In #16, subjects were asked to play the game in the role of the column player (i.e. facing negative numbers). In #144, the column and row roles were reversed and subjects were asked to play the game as the row player (again facing negative payoffs). Herein the actions will be referred as "-2" and "-1" (students were presented with actions denoted by letters). There was almost no difference in the behavior of subjects in these two variants: 84-87% of the subjects played "-1" (includes only subjects who did not play #15). Therefore, judging only from the observed behavior one can conclude that the framing of the zero-sum game (whether the player who faces negative payoffs is the row player or the column player) is immaterial. However, the response time data raises the possibility that the choice of "-1" has a somewhat different meaning in each of the two versions. When playing as a row player (#144), with n=653, the action "-1" had the quickest response time (44s vs. 54s), probably reflecting the participants' instinctive deterrence from the payoff "-2". When playing as a column player (#16), with n=734, the choice of "-1" had the slowest response time (47s. vs. 39s). This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that column players start to analyze the game from the point of view of the row player. When played as a row player, the choice of "-1" is more instinctive, reflecting the deterrence from the potential loss of "-2". When playing as the column player, the choice of "-1" might also be his best response given the player's prediction that the row player will choose the instinctive choice of "2", which is an expression of contemplative thinking.
Hoteling's Main Street Game (#68)
The following is a three-player discrete variant of Hoteling (1929) Imagine you are the manager of a chain of cafes competing with two other similar chains. Each of you is about to rent a shop in one of the 7 new identical huge apartment buildings standing along a beach strip.
Once each of you knows exactly where the other two competitors locate, it will be too late to move to another location. You expect that the customers (the residents in the 7 buildings) will not distinguish between the three cafes and will pick the one which is closest to their home. In which building (a number between 1 and 7) will you locate your cafe?
The game's unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy assigns probabilities (0.4, 0.2, 0.4) to positions 3, 4 and 5, respectively. The results (for n=8329) show that 43% chose the middle position, which is double the equilibrium prediction (in contrast, in the two-player version of the game, which appears on the site (#71), 69% of the 10,336 subjects chose the middle position). Only 10% of the subjects chose the dominated actions 1 and 7. The choice of 4 is intuitively the instinctive action. In the analysis, the non-contemplative actions were combined with the dominated actions 1 and 7. And indeed the choices 1, 4 and 7 are all associated with much lower RT than the four actions 2,3,5,6, which are classified as contemplative.
The Two-Contest Game (#66)
This game was suggested in Huberman and Rubinstein (2000) . Subjects were asked to choose one of two contests. In each one, subjects compete by guessing, as closely as possible, the outcome of either 20 tosses of a coin or 20 rolls of a die. n=1901 Percent MRT Coin 68% 71s Die 32% 88s Imagine you are participating in a game with over 200 participants worldwide. Each participant chooses to compete in one of two contests. In contest A, each contestant guesses the outcomes of 20 coin flips (heads or tails). In contest B, each contestant guesses the outcomes of 20 rolls of a die (i.e., each of the twenty guesses is a number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6). Each contest will be conducted independently. In each contest, you will be competing against people who, like you, chose that contest. After the guesses of all the participants are collected, a computer will simulate a series of 20 coin flips for contest A and a series of 20 rolls of a die for contest B. The winner of each contest will be the person with the most correct guesses. (In the case of a tie, the winner will be chosen by a lottery among those with the most correct guesses.) I choose to participate in:
A rational player would choose the contest he believes will attract fewer subjects. The instinctive choice is the "easiest" task (i.e. the coin toss). Out of 1901 subjects, 68% chose "coin toss" and indeed their response time was much lower than for those who chose "roll of the die" (71s vs. 88s). Thus, the choice of "coin toss" is classified as instinctive and "roll of the die" as contemplative.
Relying on other player's rationality (#3)
n=13524 Percent MRT A 60% 56s B 40% 51s In this game, there is a common interest for the players to reach the outcome (A, A). However, player 1 will suffer a large loss if player 2 does not play rationally. Thus, B is the instinctive action in this game. The choice of A requires that the player trusts the other player to play rationally and therefore is classified as contemplative. Among 13,524 subjects, 60% chose A. The classification of A as contemplative is supported by its MRT (56s), which is somewhat longer than that of the play-it-safe option B (51s). This game is designed to determine whether subjects follow a process of successive elimination of dominated strategies. Only 27% of the 13,399 subjects chose B, the survivor of the successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and their MRT is extremely high (153s). Therefore, the choice in B is certainly not instinctive. The actions C and D are instinctive since their relatively high payoffs attract the attention of subjects. Indeed, the response times of C and D are much lower (85-89s) than that of B which is classified as contemplative. The action A is dominated by C and the RT of the 4% of subjects who chose A is the lowest among the four choices. 
Successive Elimination (#4)

The Dictator Game (#195 (187+188))
Subjects were randomly assigned to play one of two versions of the Dictator Game with $100 (virtual money) "on the table". In #187, they were asked to decide how much to give to the other person; in #188 they decided how much to keep for themselves. Imagine that you and another person (who you do not know) are to share $100. You need to decide how to split the $100 between the two of you. #187: How much will you give to the other person (and you keep the rest)? #188: How much will you keep for yourself (with the rest going to the other person)?
The results of the two versions are remarkably similar. On average and in both versions, the dictator gave $29 to the other person. In both versions, 24% of the subjects took the entire sum for themselves and 11-12% gave the other player only $1. The fair division was chosen by 36-40% of the subjects. In both versions, the fair division appears to be instinctive and indeed is associated with the quickest response. Those who gave the other person less than $50 were classified as contemplative. How to interpret the action of those gave more than $50 (3-5% of the subjects) is uncertain: is it a case of generosity or of misunderstanding the problem? To be on the safe side and given the small proportion of subjects in this category, these subjects were omitted from the analysis.
Given the almost identical results of the two versions, the results are merged in the rest of the analysis. Imagine that you and another person (who you do not know) are to share $100. You must make an offer as to how to split the $100 between the two of you and he must either accept or reject your offer. In the case that he rejects the offer, neither of you will get anything. What will your offer be? I offer the following amount to the other person (and if he agrees I will get the remainder):
An equal division of the money seems to be the instinctive choice in the Ultimatum Game. Out of 13,957 subjects, 49% chose to equally divide the money and their response time (40s) was clearly the lowest. Thus, the choice of "50" is classified as instinctive. The MRT of the 11% of subjects (the "victims of game theory") who chose 0 or 1 is much higher (55s) as is the MRT of subjects who chose a number within the range 2-49. Interestingly, 17% of the subjects chose a number above 50. Such a choice might be the result of contemplative thinking or may be the outcome of confusion between giving and taking. Unlike in the Dictator Game, these subjects are a large proportion of the total and their response time does not indicate carelessness. Therefore, they will be classified as contemplative.
The one-shot chain store game (#28)
n=7148 Percent MRT Enter 47% 84s Not 53% 68s In your neighborhood, there is one grocery store and one tailor. At the moment, the profits of the grocery store owner are around $10K per month while the tailor's profits are only $4K per month. The tailor asks your advice about whether to change his shop into a grocery store. He figures that if the grocer does not respond aggressively to the new competition, each of them will earn about $6K per month. On the other hand, if the grocer does respond aggressively and starts a price war, then the earnings of each store will be reduced to about $2K per month. What is your advice to the tailor? Subjects (n=7148) were asked to play the role of the entrant in Selten (1978) 's one-shot chain store game, which was presented verbally. The safe action, i.e. not to enter and to remain at the lower but safer level of profit, seems to be the instinctive one. The MRT of the 53% of subjects who chose the safe action (68s) was much lower than that of the 47% of subjects who chose the risky action (84s). Thus, "Entry" is classified as the contemplative action and "No Entry" as the instinctive one. You are playing the following "game" with an anonymous person. Each of the players has an "account" with an initial balance of $0. At each stage, one of the players (in alternating order -you start) has the right to stop the game. If it is your turn to stop the game and you choose not to your account is debited by $1 and your opponent's is credited by $3. Each time your opponent has the opportunity to stop the game and chooses not to, your account is credited by $3 and his is debited by $1. The game lasts for 200 stages. If both players choose not to stop the game for 100 turns, the game ends and each player receives the balance in his account (which is $200; check this in order to verify that you understand the game). At which turn (between 1 and 100) do you plan to stop the game? (If you plan not to stop the game at any point write 101).
The Centipede Game (#33)
Subjects (n=7111) were asked to play the role of the leading player in Rosenthal (1981)'s Centipede Game with 100 turns. It was presented as a contemplative game (namely, a player is to choose the turn in which he intends to stop the game; the number 101 stands for "never stop").
The choices in the range 96-100 had the highest response times and are classified as contemplative. The choice of the Nash equilibrium strategy ("1") is also classified as contemplative. The instinctive action is "never stop" which is also the most popular choice (58%). The choices in the range of 2-95 (10%) seem to be random and are also classified as instinctive. 
The "Stop or Pass Game" (#34)
In this game, each of 20 players in turn can either stop the game and receive $10 or pass. If all 20 players pass, each receives $11. Subjects were asked to imagine that they are the player who starts the game.
n=6267 Percent MRT Stop 61% 44s Pass 39% 49s The response time results (n=6,267) support the intuition that stopping the game is the instinctive action. In this version of Basu (1994) 's Traveler's Dilemma Game, players announce a demand in the range of 180-300 (n=15,215). If one player asks for a strictly lower amount than the other, he receives an additional $5 at the expense of the other player. The instinctive action, chosen by 44%, is clearly 300 (MRT=81s). The choices in the range MRT=85s) are also classified as instinctive. The choice of alternatives in the range 295-299 (16%, MRT=109s) are usually interpreted as an outcome of k-level reasoning and thus are classified as contemplative. Another choice which is classified as contemplative is the unique Nash equilibrium choice of 180 (21%, MRT= 97s).
The Traveler's Dilemma (#53)
A new typology: the spectrum between Instinctive and Contemplative
This section presents the core idea of the paper -a proposed new typology of players. The typology is applicable (at most) in games like those discussed in Section 2, in which an intuitive distinction is possible between actions chosen on the basis of contemplative considerations and those that are the outcome of instinctive reasoning.
The typology proposed for such games defines a player's type according to his tendency to choose a contemplative action. In a formal model (whose development is in progress), an agent would be characterized by (aside from more conventional characteristics) the probability of choosing a contemplative action whenever he makes a decision.
Note that a player's type specifies the probability that he will choose a particular type of action (i.e. instinctive or contemplative) rather than specifying the particular action that the player will choose. This is in line with Arad and Rubinstein (2012) who found a correlation between the actions of a player in the Colonel Blotto game and in the 11-20 money request game in this sense, namely according to a classification of actions as instinctive/contemplative rather than a classification on the level of strategies.
Given a set of games and a contemplative-instinctive division of strategies for each game, a subject's type is determined using the contemplative index (CI), which is defined as the proportion of games in which he has chosen a contemplative action. A CI of 1 means that he has always chosen a contemplative action and a CI of 0 means that he has always chosen an instinctive strategy.
The typology is tested using the results from the 11 games described in Section 3. Only subjects who played at least 7 of the 11 games are included. For each game, the CI of each subject is calculated on the basis of the results for all the other games. Ideally, the correlation would be calculated between CI and the probability that a player will play contemplatively in the eleventh game. However, since each player plays the eleventh game only once, this probability can be estimated only by the frequency of the choice of contemplative actions within groups of players with similar CI.
The following table presents 11 graphs, each containing ten points. The blue diamonds above x on the horizontal axis indicate the proportion of subjects whose CI is between x and x+0.1 and who chose a contemplative action. The red bars indicate the proportion of subjects whose CI is between x and x+0.1. For example, the graph for game #15 is based on 1238 subjects who responded to this problem and at least 6 of the other 10 games. The leftmost point on the graph indicates that 34% of the 3% of subjects with CI in the range 0-0.1 chose the contemplative action.
To further emphasize the relationship, each of the graphs also includes a linear regression line where each point is weighted by the proportion of subjects in the corresponding range. Thus, for example, the linear approximation of the ten points in game #15 is PC=36.6+14.7 CI.
That CI has some "predictive power" is quite clear from the graphs. 
Results for additional games in light of the new typology
This section discusses several additional games in which actions cannot be intuitively classified as contemplative or instinctive. The CI (calculated on the basis of the 11 basic games) is used to provide an interpretation or even a "prediction" of the choices in these games.
Responders in the Ultimatum Game (#25 and #86)
Subjects were asked to play the game in the role of responder. They were randomly assigned to respond to an offer of either $10 or $5 (out of $100). You and someone you do not know are to share $100. He makes you an offer and you can either accept it or reject it. If you reject it, neither of you will get anything. #25: He offers you $10 (if you accept, he will get $90). #86: He offers you $5 (if you accept, he will get $95). Do you accept the offer?
About 62% out of the 7,978 subjects responded that they would accept an offer of $10 while 54% out of 4315 subjects responded that they would accept $5. In both cases, there is no difference between the response time cdf's of those who accepted the offer and those who rejected it. That is, there is no indication that one of the two options is more instinctive than the other. Nevertheless, the graphs in Table 14 show that CI is correlated with the acceptance rate. In particular, the acceptance rate for the offer of $10 is 49% for CI up to 0.4 as compared to 68% for CI above 0.4. Similarly, the acceptance rate for the offer of $5 is 47% among the subjects with CI of up to 0.4 and 59% for CI greater than 0.4. e (38% of the e 15% who c 
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The Global Index
The typology proposed above classifies subjects using observations of their past behavior. Rubinstein (2013) proposed an alternative index which classifies subjects according to their response time, i.e. fast or slow. The calculation of the index is as follows: For each subject and each problem in the dataset (which was responded to by at least 600 subjects), the subject's "Local rank" is defined as the fraction of subjects who answered that problem faster than he did. A "Global Index" (GI), which is the median of the local rankings, is calculated for each subject who answered at least 9 problems (the median number of answers for a participant who received a global rank is 15). The GI was calculated for about half of the subjects. The distribution of global rankings is presented in Rubinstein (2013) and shows that the distribution of GI is much more dispersed than if the local rankings were distributed uniformly. This implies the existence of a significant correlation between the local rankings of the same subject in different problems. The correlation between local and global rankings is almost always between 0.5 and 0.7.
The connection between GI and the tendency to choose contemplative actions is demonstrated in Table 21 . Once again, each graph refers to one of the 11 games. Each point refers to a decile in the GI ladder. The k'th blue diamond relates to the subjects in the k'th decile (from the bottom). It indicates the median GI in the corresponding decile and the proportion of subjects in the decile who chose a contemplative action.
The positive relationship between GI and contemplative behavior is evident from the graphs, although the positive trend is less pronounced than was the case for CI. (The average regression coefficient is 19 as compared to 24 in the corresponding regressions for CI.) 
Discussion
A novel typology is proposed for players of games in which a clear distinction can be made between instinctive and contemplative strategies. According to this typology, a player is characterized by his tendency to choose a contemplative action (as opposed to an instinctive action).
The proposed typology is a hybrid of two approaches to classifying agents: one which uses observed behavior in previous games as a predictor of behavior in other games and one which uses response time in previous games to predict a player's behavior in other games. Response time data is used to confirm the intuitive partition of actions into contemplative (long RT) and instinctive (short RT). Correlations are calculated in the domain of "classes of actions" rather than the domain of "individual actions". A highly contemplative type is an agent who tends to choose contemplative actions more often than instinctive actions.
Another typology based on the Global Index is also presented. It classifies subjects as fast or slow according to their median position on the response time ladder. Overall, the correlations between GI and the choices made appear to be somewhat weaker than for CI.
Non-objectively I find the results interesting. However, as the cliché goes: "Much more work is needed…"
